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ABSTRACT
The historic rise of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies to over $327 billion in
market capitalization has sparked significant research efforts studying their
reliability, performance, and security. Bitcoin, the highest valued cryptocur-
rency, has received the most thorough scrutiny, with many studies analyzing
its peer properties and network health. In contrast, the network layer for
Ethereum, the second-largest cryptocurrency, has gone mostly ignored, even
though it employs different algorithms for transaction propagation.
In this thesis, we perform timing analysis on transactions propagated
through Ethereum networks to identify the origin nodes. We build a tool
called TxSniper to verify our approach on Ethereum’s main network. We
find that we can identify the origin with a 70% probability; this method is
not always effective due to presence of nodes running clients that use different
implementations of transaction propagation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The historic rise of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies to over $327 billion
in market capitalization [1] has sparked significant research efforts study-
ing their reliability, performance, and security. Bitcoin, the highest valued
cryptocurrency, has received the most thorough scrutiny, with many studies
analyzing its peer-to-peer (P2P) network topology and peer properties [2, 3].
In contrast, the cryptocurrency called Ethereum has not been the subject of
many studies, with its network topology and properties still vastly unknown.
Ethereum is currently the second-largest cryptocurrency; however, the
Ethereum Foundation sees it as more than that. According to them, Ethereum
is a decentralized platform for smart contracts, which are programs that en-
able interaction between Ethereum addresses on blockchain and run without
having to deal with downtime, fraud, or third-party interference. The con-
tracts can be programmed for anything from a simple timed transaction to
creating a new cryptocurrency. An example of a smart contract that has
gained a lot of popularity recently is CryptoKitties—a virtual game that al-
lows players to collect and sell cats, all using the Ethereum blockchain [4].
The key difference between Ethereum and Bitcoin is that Ethereum is not just
a token which lets users purchase goods, but “the built-in Turing-complete
programming language that allows anyone to create contracts for any usage
beyond currency transaction” [5].
The variety and complexity of applications that Ethereum’s smart con-
tracts enable has led to many ventures and users using Ethereum as their
platform, driving the value of the cryptocurrency upto $50 billion [1] as
of July 2018. This commercial interest in Ethereum has resulted in an in-
creased number of studies on Ethereum, including works on smart contract
analysis [6, 7, 8] and attacks on smart contracts [9, 10]. However, work
exploring the underlying topology of Ethereum is extremely sparse. Under-
standing the network topology of a cryptocurrency like Ethereum provides
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methods to view events such as attacks against the network and understand
how they were carried out, as well as shed light on topology properties like
node centralization and cluster identification. An application of this in Bit-
coin is using the timing analysis of flood messages to infer the topology of the
Bitcoin network [3]. Insight into Bitcoin’s underlying network topology and
protocols have also exposed a network-level vulnerability that enabled ap-
plication level attacks [11] that allowed attackers to create forks and launch
double-spend attacks. Using network topology information in an adversarial
manner is possible, with eclipse attacks against Bitcoin based on network
positioning and topology commonplace [12].
One of the first steps in understanding topology is being able to identify
the source of a transaction, by deanonymizing the sender. Deanonymization
of senders enables all transactions to be traced back to their origin, and this
is useful in tracking the flow of money from specific accounts.
In this thesis, we explore the underlying mechanisms by which Ethereum
transactions propagate, and we use our knowledge of these mechanisms in
presenting a method to identify the origin of an Ethereum transaction. In
order to gain a full understanding of transaction propagation in Ethereum,
we first performed a case study on the two most popular clients, Geth and
Parity, to gain insight into the behavior of Ethereum nodes. Based on our
observations, we designed a network of controlled Ethereum nodes that we
used to analyze transaction propagation in detail. Using this experimen-
tal network and data collected with scanning and monitoring utilities for
Ethereum’s underlying P2P network [13], we developed a method to infer
the origin of a transaction based on timing analysis. To test our method on
the network, we created a tool that allows us to generate transactions in a
controlled manner, called TxSniper.
In summary, the contributions of this thesis are as follows:
• A case study of the two most popular Ethereum clients, Geth and
Parity, to gain insight into the behavior of Ethereum nodes.
• A method to infer the origin of a transaction based on timing analysis
of transaction arrival times.
• Development of a tool, TxSniper, to verify our approach to deanonymize
the sender of a transaction.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND
Ethereum is a blockchain platform for distributed computing and was the first
major blockchain to support Turing-complete scripting via smart contracts,
which are expressed as opcodes specific to the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) [14]. Ethereum also operates as a cryptocurrency by supporting the
transfer of tokens called Ether between Ethereum accounts. In addition to
its use as a fiat currency, Ether is also used to incentivize Ethereum nodes
to perform distributed computation. Ether can also be converted to gas,
which is used as a fee for executing transactions and smart contracts, and
effectively mitigates spam.
Similar to other cryptocurrencies, Ethereum’s blockchain is managed by
a peer-to-peer (P2P) network. Ethereum’s network communication is com-
prised of three different protocols, which run on top of UDP and TCP: RLPx
for node discovery and secure transport, DEVp2p for peer connection man-
agement, and the Ethereum application-level protocol (henceforth referred to
as Ethereum subprotocol). We provide a high-level overview in Figure 2.1
and expand on the pertinent details for each protocol below, drawing upon
official specifications [15, 16, 17].
2.1 RLPx
The RLPx protocol is based on Kademlia, a widely used distributed hash
table (DHT) [18]. RLPx is used by an Ethereum node in order to help it to
discover other potential Ethereum nodes to connect to. In order to do this,
each node is assigned a 512-bit node ID, and maintains a routing table for
monitoring peer connected nodes and their neighbors. In order for a new
Ethereum node to find peers, it first adds some hardcoded bootstrap node
IDs into its table. Then, to find a new node on the network, it sends out
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Figure 2.1: Ethereum Network Protocols—We provide an overview of
RLPx, DEVp2p, and Ethereum subprotocol and display a typical workflow
for a new node joining the Ethereum network. These protocols run on top
of UDP (dotted-line) and TCP (solid line), through a series of request
(solid arrow) and response (hollow arrow) messages.
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a FINDNODE message with the node ID it is looking for to its peers, which
respond with a NEIGHBORS message containing the closest nodes in their
routing tables. The querying node will then update its own table with the
information (node ID, IP Address, UDP/TCP ports), based on the neighbor
nodes sent by each peer. Additionally, the querying node sends out a PING
message periodically to the nodes in its table, and all nodes that received
the message will reply with a PONG. This process is repeated by the querying
node until it finds the target node ID.
2.2 DEVp2p
After peer nodes have been discovered through RLPx and a secure TCP
connection is established, DEVp2p negotiates an application session between
two connected peers. Each node must first send its peer a HELLO message,
which details its own node ID, DEVp2p version, client name, supported
application protocols/versions, and the port number (30303 by default) that
the node is theoretically listening on. The peers have to exchange the HELLO
message and provide their node information in order to establish a DEVp2p
connection. Based on HELLO message information, the nodes may begin to
transmit application data packets over DEVp2p. During periods of inactivity,
DEVp2p nodes will periodically send DEVp2p PING messages (not to be
confused with RLPx PING) at an interval set by the client to ensure their
connected peers are still active and have not crashed. If a corresponding
DEVp2p PONG message is not received within the maximum allowed idle
time set by the client, then the node will send a DISCONNECT message, which
may include an error code explaining the disconnect.
2.3 Ethereum Subprotocol
The Ethereum subprotocol runs on top of DEVp2p and is denoted as “eth”
during DEVp2p HELLO exchange. At a high level, the Ethereum subproto-
col is used to retrieve and store information on the Ethereum blockchain.
Note that this does not include the details of smart contract execution and
Ethereum blockchain mining—rather, we focus on the messages used to com-
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municate blockchain state information over the network. Since the official
launch of Ethereum in July 2015 [19], three major versions of the Ethereum
subprotocol have been released: 61, 62, and 63. The network initially used
version 61, and 62/63 were added in October 2015 [20]. Versions 62/63 be-
came the standard when 61 was disabled in August 2016 [21]. The following
description applies to versions 62/63.
The first message that must be sent by both peer nodes after the DEVp2p
HELLO handshake is a STATUS message, which conveys the current state of a
node’s blockchain. It contains a node’s protocol version, network ID (mul-
tiple distinct Ethereum networks exist), and the Keccak-256 hash of the
first block in the blockchain, a.k.a. the genesis hash, since there may also
be multiple distinct blockchains for a single network ID. The mainstream
Ethereum blockchain exists on network ID 1 (i.e. Mainnet) with genesis hash
d4e56740...b1cb8fa3, and it supports the DAO fork1 STATUS information
is used by nodes to determine which peers they should connect to. If a node
encounters a peer that is on a different Ethereum network or genesis hash,
it will disconnect from that peer.
Peers that remain connected after STATUS message exchange utilize two
additional STATUS message fields to coordinate blockchain syncing: the hash
of the most recent block known to a node (i.e. best hash) and the total
difficulty of its blockchain. For illustrative purposes, consider a new node
joining the Ethereum network. It begins downloading a local copy of the full
blockchain by first sending GET BLOCK HEADERS messages to obtain a list of
block headers, which include block meta information such as parent block
hash, miner address, and a freeform field for extra information, which is used
to detect the DAO fork and distinguish between mainstream Ethereum and
Ethereum Classic, among other uses. After it has compiled a list of missing
block hashes, the node then sends GET BLOCK BODIES messages to retrieve
full block contents and verify the validity of the blockchain.
Blockchain validation consists of two general phases: (1) block header
validation and (2) blockchain state validation. Block header validation, as
defined in section 4.3.4 of the Ethereum Yellow Paper [14], checks a block’s
1The DAO fork is a hard fork that occurred on July 20, 2016 returning approximately
$40 million worth of Ether stolen from the DAO contract in June 2016 to a refund smart
contract [22]. As a result of the fork, the mainstream Ethereum blockchain split into two,
and the non-supporting blockchain became Ethereum Classic.
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parent block hash, block number, timestamp, difficulty, gas limit, and valid
mix hash, which is the output of the Hashimoto mining algorithm that proves
sufficient computation has been carried out on the block. Blockchain state
validation consists of sequentially executing all transactions, recording ev-
ery account’s state in a global database, and inserting each state snapshot
as a node in the global Merkle Patricia state tree. Blockchain state vali-
dation requires significantly more computation and time than block header
validation.
In order to reduce the time for new nodes to synchronize and validate the
entire blockchain, Ethereum version 63 introduced fast sync, an optional op-
erational mode which reduces the blockchain state validation workload and
improves syncing times by approximately an order of magnitude [23]. After
downloading all block headers and bodies, a fast sync node picks a pivot
point block that is close to the most recent head of the blockchain. From
the genesis block to the pivot point, the node only performs block header
validation, and in lieu of blockchain state validation, the node downloads
transaction receipts via GET RECEIPTS messages, which retrieve meta infor-
mation including gas consumption, transaction logs, and status code. At the
pivot point, a fast sync node utilizes GET NODE DATA messages to download a
global state database at that block. From the pivot point onward, the node
performs full blockchain validation.
Once a node has been synced to the blockchain, it can actively participate
in the network by announcing and listening to the two possible blockchain
events: new transactions and new blocks. In order to add new transaction(s)
to the blockchain, an Ethereum node (hereafter referred to as the “transac-
tion origin node”) can broadcast a TRANSACTIONS message to all of its active
Ethereum peers. A TRANSACTIONS message typically contains one or more
transaction objects, which contain three main fields - sender address, receiver
address and amount. However, there are other fields that can be specified,
such as GasPrice or Gas, which define how much the sender is willing to pay
to get the transaction confirmed on the blockchain. Usually, the higher the
GasPrice and Gas specified, the quicker the transaction gets confirmed. For
non-origin nodes, upon receipt of a TRANSACTIONS message, all transactions
in the message are validated locally to ensure that they are signed properly,
do not exceed size/gas limits, do not transact a negative value, and have
senders with sufficient Ether/gas. The recipient node then broadcasts valid
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transactions to all peers except those that are likely to already know about
the transaction, i.e. the peers that sent the transaction and the peers that
have previously been sent the transaction. New block propagation occurs
similarly through NEW BLOCK HASHES and NEW BLOCK messages. The primary
difference is that a node with n peers will only broadcast NEW BLOCK to
√
n
peers, which reduces the network load on individual nodes at the cost of
longer overall block propagation times.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS
3.1 Case Study
While the documentation for Ethereum’s full network stack (RLPx, DEVp2p,
Ethereum subprotocol) defines message formats and functionality, it provides
sparse guidance on transaction sending behavior, which can be implemented
in a variety of ways. For instance, when a node is broadcasting a set of
transactions to its peers using TRANSACTIONS messages, the order and speed
of sending can potentially vary based on implementation, and this choice
can have drastically different impacts with regards to transaction propaga-
tion and confirmation. In order to gain insight into transaction propagation
behavior on the network, we deployed and profiled the operation of the two
most popular Ethereum clients [24], Go Ethereum (also known as Geth),
which is Ethereum’s Golang implementation [25], and Parity, a Rust imple-
mentation [26].
From January 24 – February 1, 2018, we instrumented and ran Parity ver-
sion 1.7.9 with default settings on an Ubuntu 16.04 machine with 128GB RAM,
32 cores, and a 10 Gb/s network link. Similarly from April 1–10, 2018, we
instrumented and profiled Geth version 1.7.3 with the same resources as Par-
ity. We recorded all messages sent and received (Figures 3.1 and 3.2), along
with any changes in the number of connected peers (Figure 3.3).
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Figure 3.1: Geth Message I/O—The counts of messages sent/received by
Geth reveal that an overwhelming 84.6% and 79.2% of sent/received
messages were TRANSACTIONS messages.
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Figure 3.2: Parity Message I/O—The counts of messages sent/received
by Parity reveal that Parity sends significantly fewer TRANSACTIONS
messages than Geth, only 4.6% of sent messages. Parity also displays
irregular RLPx PING/PONG spikes.
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Figure 3.3: Peer Counts—Geth and Parity converge to their default 25
and 50 peers, respectively, and remain relatively stable over the course of a
week.
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From our case study, we made the following observations:
1. Geth and Parity reached their default peer limits in a matter of minutes,
with Geth converging to a maximum of 25 peers, and Parity converging
to 50 peers (Figure 3.3). A network-encompassing scanner must ignore
the hardcoded peer limits to continuously discover new nodes and mon-
itor existing ones. Additionally, even though Geth and Parity nodes
were relatively stable—they were at maximum peer occupancy 98.1%
and 91.5% of the time, respectively—they still fluctuated enough to
provide brief windows of opportunity for a network scanner to connect
to them over time. This also gives us insight into the fact that each
transaction can be sent to at most 25 peers for Geth, and 50 peers for
Parity, which is useful in determining topology as the maximum edges
for a node can be either 25 or 50.
2. Once a node has synchronized with the blockchain, TRANSACTIONS mes-
sages dominate network I/O. Geth and Parity received similar propor-
tions of TRANSACTIONS messages, but Geth sent significantly more to
the network. Examining the source code reveals that while Geth broad-
casted transactions to all of its peers, Parity only sent transactions to√
n peers. This difference in the transaction broadcast mechanism high-
lights a key difference between Geth and Parity, which may be a cause
for concern as we apply our technique.
3. To gain a deeper understanding into topology we needed to look at why
nodes would disconnect from their peers and to that effect, we exam-
ined the DISCONNECT messages (Table 3.1). The most popular discon-
nect reason for both Geth and Parity was Too many peers, which occurs
when connecting to a node that has already reached its maximum peer
limit. The next most commonly observed disconnect reasons were Sub-
protocol error, Disconnect requested, and Useless peer. These indicate
either a non-Ethereum protocol on the DEVp2p network, an incompat-
ible Ethereum blockchain (e.g. Ethereum Classic), or a faulty protocol
implementation. Because we ultimately aim to measure the functional
Ethereum network (i.e. the main network with correct genesis hash
and DAO fork), we do not try to reduce these disconnections.
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3.2 Private Network Test
In order to gain a full understanding of transaction propagation between
multiple nodes, we ran a private network locally that simulated the real
Ethereum network. Ethereum, since it is built on top of DEVp2p, allows
different networks of Ethereum to exist, but to ensure these other networks
do not interact or affect the main network, each network has its own network
ID. Due to this, it is possible to create our own private network, specifically
for the purpose of understanding transaction propagation. The advantages
of this over running on the main network is that we will not be using real
money, and we are able to control all nodes that would be on the network.
Our goal with this experiment was to identify all factors that would affect
transaction propagation times, and we narrowed these factors down to:
• Latency between nodes
• Client processing times, at both the sender and receiver
Our network consisted of 26 nodes in total, all running Geth, and included
one miner node that would allow movement of blocks and transactions on
the network. Figure 3.4 shows our private network setup, which includes:
• S, the node from which all transactions would originate.
• M , the monitor node at which we track all transactions sent by all
other nodes on the network.
• Ri, the relay nodes, which are normal Ethereum nodes which will only
propagate transactions.
• Mi, the miner node.
Each of these nodes was running Geth version 1.7.3, with modifications to
the source code that allowed us to log timing information for each sent and
received transaction, on each of the nodes. There were no other modifications
to the propagation mechanism, as we wanted to simulate the normal Geth
client as much as possible. All nodes were run on the same location, which
meant that any latency would be minimal. With this setup, we sent 100
transactions, all originating from node S, and monitored three different times:
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Figure 3.4: Private network setup.
• The time between the first transaction being sent and the last transac-
tion being sent on node S.
• The time between receiving a transaction and sending a transaction on
the relay nodes Ri.
• The time of arrivals of the transactions at the monitor node M .
This setup ensures that latency delay will not affect any of the transaction
processing or transaction propagation times. In order to understand the
effect of latency on these times, we conducted the same experiment, but we
swapped 25% of the relay nodes with 5 nodes running on an Amazon Web
Services (AWS) EC2 instance in a different geographic region. The instance
was a T2 unlimited micro1 Ubuntu 16.04 LTS instance equipped with 1
virtual CPU and 1 GB RAM in Asia Pacific Southeast region (Sydney). We
performed the same experiment, sending 100 transactions from node S and
monitored the same times. Figure 3.5 shows the average times for each of the
relay nodes (with 25% of the relay nodes on AWS) to receive a transaction
and then send that same transaction.
1https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/instance-types/
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Figure 3.5: Distribution of processing time by node on the private network.
From this we learned the following:
• The time taken by a relay node to process a received transaction and
propagate has little impact on the overall transaction propagation time.
This time is also unaffected by latency, as this processing is carried out
locally, within the client itself.
• The average time at the origin (node S) between sending a transaction
to the first peer and the final peer is the same order of magnitude in
the case where all nodes are on the same machine (2.8ms), and when
25% of the nodes are running on AWS (2.4ms). This implies that the
time between sending the transaction to the first peer and the last peer
is minimal, and is unaffected by latency.
3.3 Code Analysis and Testing on Ropsten Network
3.3.1 Code Analysis
To gain insight into transaction propagation from a code perspective, we
conducted a code analysis of both the Geth and Parity. We focused on the
transaction propagation mechanism only, as that was the only portion of the
code that would affect how transactions were sent to peers, and was relevant
to our goal of identifying the origin of a transaction.
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Figure 3.6: The code for the BroadcastTx function in Geth v1.7.3.
Figure 3.7: The code for the propagate transactions to peers function
in Parity v1.7.9.
For Geth, we looked at version 1.7.3, specifically at the BroadcastTx func-
tion shown in Figure 3.6. Whenever a transaction is received, it triggers an
event which causes this function to be called, passing to it two arguments -
hash, which is the hash of the transaction to be broadcasted, and tx, which
contains the full transaction information corresponding to hash. We found
that Geth sends the transaction to its peers in a loop, which at first led us
to believe that this could lead to blocking future sends until the current iter-
ation completes. However, this loop is only write-blocked, which means that
blocking only occurs until the message has been sent, and it does not wait
for a response from the target. The other observation we made was that the
choice of data structure for peers was a map. For a map data structure in
Go, the ordering of peers in a loop is randomized, which means that each
transaction, even if broadcasted to the same set of peers, will have a unique
ordering of peers for the broadcast.
In the case of Parity, we analyzed version 1.7.9, looking at the
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propagate transactions to peers function. Figure 3.7 shows a portion of
the function, where we can see a loop in which the transaction packet is sent
to all peers in a lucky peers set. This set lucky peers highlights the major
difference between sending transactions in Parity, which unlike Geth, sends
a received transaction to a subset of its peers, specifically a random
√
n set
of its peers who do not already know about the transaction. Parity, similar
to Geth, keeps track of which transactions were sent to a peer, and makes
sure that it does not select a peer to send to, that already knows about the
transaction. Another similarity between Geth and Parity is that both use
a map data structure to represent the peers to send the transaction to. An
interesting point to note here is that in the Geth code, there is a comment
which makes a note to change the peers from accessing all peers in the loop,
to a subset of peers, the length determined by
√
n of its total peers. As of
Geth version 1.8.11, this change has not been implemented.
3.3.2 Ropsten Testing
To do further testing, we set up a Geth node and a Parity node on the Ropsten
network. In order to verify our understanding of the code, we performed
a simple test to see if the clients behaved in the way we predicted. Our
setup involved us running 1 Geth and 1 Parity node, connected to a normal
operation Geth node. Using this standard Geth, we connected to the Geth
and Parity nodes, and sent them a number of transactions. For the Geth
node, we used version 1.7.3, modified to add logging information to both send
transaction and receive transaction events. Similarly, we used version 1.7.9
for Parity, with modifications to log send transaction and receive transaction
events.
We find that for the Geth client, the behavior matches that of the code,
and we also see that the time between a node receiving a transaction and
sending that transaction to its peers is much higher than we saw earlier in
the case of the private network. The reason for this is due to other nodes
sending us transactions at the same time. All the transactions get put into
a queue, and each transaction is then sent to its peers from the queue. This
means that if a transaction arrives when the queue is empty, the time between
receiving and sending will be small, but if the queue is filled, then the time
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will be much larger.
In the case of Parity, we find that the sent transactions do mirror the code,
in that for each send transaction event, it sends to
√
n of the total peers.
However, for a particular transaction, it makes multiple send events, with
each successive send event having fewer peers to send to. From this, we can
surmise that eventually, all the peers of the Parity node will receive the trans-
action, however, it will take longer on average to receive a transaction from
a parity node than from a Geth node. This also has implications for using
timing analysis to infer transaction origin, because we rely on the fact that a
directly connected peer should receive a transaction fastest. However, in the
case of Parity, even a directly connected node may receive the transaction
much later, if the node is not chosen in the first set of peers to send to.
3.4 Validation
3.4.1 Tools - NodeFinder, EthMonitor, and TxSniper
Validating our hypothesis requires full visibility of Ethereum networks and
logging all TRANSACTIONS messages coming from other nodes. Unlike the
private network, which is a small P2P network with 26 nodes that we con-
trol, real Ethereum networks, such as the main network Homestead and the
test network Ropsten, have several hundreds to thousands of nodes that we
have no information on. To overcome this challenge, we used NodeFinder
and EthMonitor, open-source2 tools for scanning and monitoring Ethereum’s
P2P network [13]. NodeFinder identifies active DEVp2p nodes, period-
ically retrieves their client information (from DEVp2p HELLO) as well as
their Ethereum blockchain status (from Ethereum STATUS), and stores every
node’s information on a remote database. EthMonitor periodically obtains
addresses of all nodes on a target Ethereum network, maintains as many peer
connections as possible, and logs details of every TRANSACTIONS message from
the peers. Logged details include message arrival timestamp in Unix Epoch
time with accuracy up to microseconds, message size, data and hash of each
transaction in the message, peer’s node ID in hex, peer’s IP address, and
connection latency.
2https://www.github.com/teamnsrg/ethereum-p2p
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To identify nodes on Ethereum Mainnet and Ropsten networks, we ran
30 instances of NodeFinder on an Ubuntu 16.04 machine with 128GB RAM,
32 cores, and a 10 Gb/s network link from April 18 to July 9, 2018. On
different Ubuntu 16.04 machines with the same hardware specification, we
ran 1 instance of EthMonitor for each network and collected TRANSACTIONS
messages from peers, from May 6 to July 7 for Ropsten and from June 22 to
July 9 for Mainnet. To handle a large number of concurrent peer connections,
we increased the system limits on number of open files to 1,048,576 and
configured network buffer size and ephemeral port range of TCP as listed
below:
net.core.rmem_max = 16777216
net.core.wmem_max = 16777216
net.ipv4.tcp_rmem = 4096 87380 16777216
net.ipv4.tcp_wmem = 4096 65536 16777216
net.ipv4.ip_local_port_range = 1024 65000
Our validation setup also requires an origin node, where we generate new
transactions and control their initial propagation routes. To enable this,
we built and ran TxSniper, a tool that sends a transaction to one or more
selected peers at a time instead of always broadcasting it to all peers. We
implemented TxSniper by modifying Geth 1.7.3. We first made the client
so that it only connects to and maintains connections with targeted nodes
instead of participating in node discovery, just like EthMonitor. Second,
we implemented a new function called SnipeTransaction which—unlike the
original function SendTransaction—sends a transaction to only the peers
whose node IDs are specified in arguments of the function call. We made
the function available to users in a form of Javascript API that can be used
through the Geth’s built-in Javascript console or RPC requests [27].
3.4.2 Results
Ropsten
In order to perform our test on the Ropsten network, we first created 300
Ethereum accounts on the Ropsten network, which were then each given 1
Ether, using the Ropsten Ethereum Faucet [28]. All of these accounts were
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Figure 3.8: Average rank over 10 transactions for 30 TxSniper target nodes
- Ropsten.
Figure 3.9: Client distribution of the 30 TxSniper target nodes - Ropsten.
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created on the TxSniper client, which we would use to send transactions to
a single specified node. In addition to having the TxSniper on the network,
we set up EthMonitor on Ropsten as well, so that we would have the full
monitoring capability in order to log all the messages coming in from the
nodes on the Ropsten network. We connected EthMonitor to as many nodes
as possible, and selected a random set of 30 nodes which we would use as
targets for TxSniper. We ensured that TxSniper connected to all 30 nodes,
and then we sniped each node 100 times, which meant that we sent 100
transactions using TxSniper to each of the 30 nodes. This gave us a final
set of 3,000 transactions, with 100 transactions being sent to a single target
node ID. Once we sent out all 3,000 transactions, we analyzed the logs from
EthMonitor. Since we sent the transaction to a single node using TxSniper,
that would mean that the target node would be the one to propagate it
and since EthMonitor was connected to the target node, EthMonitor should
receive it from that node. Since EthMonitor is directly connected to the
target node, the first node to send that particular transaction to EthMonitor
should be the target node itself. The results of our test on Ropsten are
shown in Figure 3.8, which displays the average rank of the sniper targets,
for the particular transactions that were sent to them only. As we can see,
there are a number of transactions where this hypothesis does not hold true.
As we know from earlier experiments, this will fail on Parity nodes, due
to their method of propagating transactions to
√
n peers. However, there
are a large number of Geth nodes where this method does not work. A
closer inspection of these nodes reveals that there are many of them that are
using various modified versions of the clients as shown in Figure 3.9 due to
this being the official Ethereum test network. We think that due to this,
there may be additional code running on these clients that might interfere
with the propagation mechanism of Geth. In order to verify if this is really
true, additional testing needed to be done on the main Ethereum network.
Figure 3.10 showcases the ASNs for the nodes that were sniped on Ropsten,
along with the node rank. It seems that some of the nodes that are on specific
ASNs seem to have a much higher average rank. This could imply that these
ASNs might have some restrictions that cause any Ethereum nodes on the
network to send transactions slower, such as firewall rules. This explains why
some nodes on specific ASNs have a high average rank.
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Figure 3.10: ASN distribution of the 30 TxSniper target nodes - Ropsten.
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Figure 3.11: Average rank over 10 transactions for 10 TxSniper target
nodes - Homestead.
Homestead
Our testing on Homestead, the main Ethereum network, was much more
limited in scope than the Ropsten test, due to the fact that transactions
require real money on the Mainnet. Because of this, we decided to scale the
experiment down to 10 nodes, using TxSniper to send each node 10 transac-
tions for a total of 100 transactions. Figure 3.11 showcases our results with
the same experiment on Homestead, displaying average rank of the targeted
node IDs. Compared to the previous graph from the Ropsten experiment,
we have about 70% of the target nodes that show up as the first node. This
shows that it is possible to identify the origin of a transaction, with about
70% probability.
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CHAPTER 4
DISCUSSION
4.1 Related Work
Inferring the toplogy of the Bitcoin network is something that has been done
in a few studies over the years. Miller et al. [29] introduced a technique that
leveraged timestamp leakage from GETADDR and ADDR messages to construct
the network topology graph of Bircoin. This study focused only on Bitcoin’s
publicly reachable nodes, and this vulnerability in the bitcoind client was
fixed in March 2015, rendering the technique ineffective. Neudecker et al. [3]
created a new timing analysis-based method to infer Bitcoin’s topology. They
used flood analysis, applying maximum likelihood estimation to timing data
for each message that arrived from peers to calculate the path lengths be-
tween those nodes. This technique works only for nodes that are active on
the network and send transactions, which amounted to 4˜4% of all peers on
the network. In order to enable the attack to work on the entire network,
actively inserting transactions is required, which would increase the cost of
the attack significantly. These kinds of deanonymization studies have been
performed for other cryptocurrencies as well.
Monero is a privacy-centric cryptocurrency that uses a protocol allowing
users to obfuscate the sources of transactions, and Moser et al. [30] showed
that using “chain-reaction” analysis and age distribution it is possible to
deanonymize the sender of a transaction on Monero. This thesis complements
these studies by providing a novel technique that can be used to deanonymize
senders for Ethereum as well as other cryptocurrencies.
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4.2 Limitations
The technique we use relies on the node sending the transaction to its peers
as soon as possible. However, as we noted, the Parity client, which is one of
the most popular clients on Ethereum, uses a different propagation technique
that sends transactions to only a subset of its peers. This means that Parity
clients will not reliably forward transactions to our monitor, and so we are
unable to determine the origin of transactions coming from Parity clients
reliably. Another issue we face is that if there are any nodes that are behind
a firewall or NAT, those nodes may not send us messages as quickly as other
nodes, due to the firewall. This would cause these nodes to have additional
send time, and this would cause problems in identifying these nodes as the
origin of a transaction.
4.3 Future Work
This is a relatively new area for Ethereum, as there has not been much re-
search into deanonymizing Ethereum senders. Prior work for Bitcoin does
provide a starting point, however, Ethereum’s transaction propagation algo-
rithm is unique and vastly different from Bitcoin. One main improvement
on this work is to develop a technique that will allow even origin nodes using
Parity to be deanonymized, which would make the entire network suscepti-
ble to deanonymization of sender. Another approach would be to increase
coverage of the network by using multiple vantage points, which would allow
further coverage of the network and would allow analysis of multiple routes
taken by a particular transaction. This would help shed light on Ethereum’s
peer-to-peer network by revealing the topology of the network, and give in-
formation about connectivity of the nodes as well as other network metrics.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
Due to their ballooning financial value, the robustness (i.e. performance,
availability, and security) of cryptocurrencies has recently come under high
scrutiny. Recent work investigating the peer-to-peer network underlying
Bitcoin has demonstrated that network robustness is imperative for proper
blockchain operation. In this thesis, we looked into the transaction propa-
gation mechanisms employed by Ethereum clients, and leveraged that in a
novel method to identify the origin of a transaction. We found that for one
of the popular clients used by a large majority of the network, the propa-
gation speed is lower, and the propagation technique used by that client is
unsuitable for inferring the origin of the client.
Using TxSniper, a tool that allowed us to propagate transactions to only
targeted peers instead of all, we validated our sender deanonymization ap-
proach on Ethereum’s test network and main network. In the main network,
we identified the origin of transactions with 70% probability. We observed
that our technique is much less effective in the test network due to the pres-
ence of unstable, unexpected client behaviors.
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